A new approach to China [zz]
原文在这里，由于伟大的墙，国内无法访问，转帖至此
想补充的是，过去的一年，越来越多的事实表明天朝的言论自由是有限的、有条件的言论自由，而“表明”这一事实的途径正是互联网。越来越多CCAV、地方台、主流网站、主流报纸中无法公布的消息被从互联网上被揭露了出来。从华南虎、天价烟，到70码、番禺，到冯正虎、刘晓波、李庄，再到《老妈蹄花》、《4851》。前两个还好，后两个问一下身边没上过推或者不FO所谓“政治推”的人，不会有人知道，就算知道也是从主流媒体知道的与“事实”完全相反的“事实”，比如李庄假证案的“证据确凿”。
从奥运会开始，中国的互联网环境已经或正在经历一场肃清。从08年中的网站“集体被维护”，到之后的绿娘、GFW蛋生，到百度、谷歌的搜索门，到大批国外网站被墙（我现在看个android的官方网站都他妈得翻墙），到清查移动互联网上的淫秽内容，到国内网站集体拉网备案，到CN域名不接受个人注册，到万网给我发来垃圾邮件（邮件直接被Gmail放到垃圾邮件箱）说：“为了切实落实工业和信息化部发出的《工业和信息化部关于进一步深入整治手机淫秽色情专项行动工作方案》(工信部电管【2009】672号)的精神，同时贯彻落实CNNIC在近日下发的《关于落实对网站未备案的域名不予解析(含跳转)的通知》，从即日起，我公司对于已注册成功的国内域名，立即启动网站未备案的域名暂停解析的清查行动，若域名发现未备案情况，我司将根据相关法规对域名进行停止解析处理，属于网站未备案的域名将立即停止解析（含跳转）”，中国的互联网环境正从“百家争鸣”向“罢黜百家”倒退。而在这一场倒退中，不同的网站被演绎着不同的剧本
- 小网站（或者“拧”网站），一棍子打死，永不翻身；比如饭否
- 人气不旺的狗腿子网站，一闷棍打晕，内部整顿，招安，然后重新招摇上市；比如嘀咕
- 人气旺的狗腿子网站，发帖审查，有敏感关键字不得发布；比如开心、校内
- 门户网站，不闻不问，一心只向主流消息，平安无事；比如新华网
- 牛逼一点的门户网站，趁各地监管部门五点半下班后发布一些非主流消息，然后在第二天他们上班解完手拿完报纸泡完茶看完K线偷完菜抽完烟后打开浏览器大喊一声“我操，这消息怎么在网上！”后“文章不存在”；比如新浪、网易
- 国外牛逼网站，墙之；比如……我操，太多了！
- 国内搜索引擎，“自觉”删除各类“需要”删除的关键字；比如百度
- 国外搜索引擎，迫于淫威被过滤关键字，附加“据当地法律法规和政策，部分搜索结果未予显示”，比如g.cn
这一次google终于忍耐不住，跳将出来，大喊一声“操，这也不让看那也不让看也就罢了，现在竟然偷偷摸到老娘身上来了，还偷老娘法宝，老娘不伺候了！干我们这行的就是让别人看的，从今儿起老娘什么都不挡了，大家爱怎么看怎么看，爱看什么看什么。你丫要不跟我谈判，要不老娘就卷铺盖走人，不在这儿练了！”结果呢？我觉得g.cn关闭是很可能的事，毕竟天朝从来就不是一个容易妥协的天朝。这可乐了老李了，在办公室大笑三声“哇咔咔，去年那400W没白扔，比雇凶黑他们效率多了，找政府办事就是靠谱”。然后QQ、网易、新浪、雅虎、有道、Live这些和google业务有竞争的估计都会明里暗里地击掌相庆“可算把这孙子撬走了，以后大中华的市场就是我们的了”。殊不知，总有一天他们运营的email、聊天记录也会被“依法检查”的。噢，不对，这些孙子已经主动交上去了……
Like many other well-known organizations, we face cyber attacks of varying degrees on a regular basis. In mid-December, we detected a highly sophisticated and targeted attack on our corporate infrastructure originating from China that resulted in the theft of intellectual property from Google. However, it soon became clear that what at first appeared to be solely a security incident–albeit a significant one–was something quite different.
First, this attack was not just on Google. As part of our investigation we have discovered that at least twenty other large companies from a wide range of businesses–including the Internet, finance, technology, media and chemical sectors–have been similarly targeted. We are currently in the process of notifying those companies, and we are also working with the relevant U.S. authorities.
Second, we have evidence to suggest that a primary goal of the attackers was accessing the Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights activists. Based on our investigation to date we believe their attack did not achieve that objective. Only two Gmail accounts appear to have been accessed, and that activity was limited to account information (such as the date the account was created) and subject line, rather than the content of emails themselves.
Third, as part of this investigation but independent of the attack on Google, we have discovered that the accounts of dozens of U.S.-, China- and Europe-based Gmail users who are advocates of human rights in China appear to have been routinely accessed by third parties. These accounts have not been accessed through any security breach at Google, but most likely via phishing scams or malware placed on the users’ computers.
We have already used information gained from this attack to make infrastructure and architectural improvements that enhance security for Google and for our users. In terms of individual users, we would advise people to deploy reputable anti-virus and anti-spyware programs on their computers, to install patches for their operating systems and to update their web browsers. Always be cautious when clicking on links appearing in instant messages and emails, or when asked to share personal information like passwords online. You can read more here about our cyber-security recommendations. People wanting to learn more about these kinds of attacks can read this U.S. government report (PDF), Nart Villeneuve’s blog and this presentation on the GhostNet spying incident.
We have taken the unusual step of sharing information about these attacks with a broad audience not just because of the security and human rights implications of what we have unearthed, but also because this information goes to the heart of a much bigger global debate about freedom of speech. In the last two decades, China’s economic reform programs and its citizens’ entrepreneurial flair have lifted hundreds of millions of Chinese people out of poverty. Indeed, this great nation is at the heart of much economic progress and development in the world today.
We launched Google.cn in January 2006 in the belief that the benefits of increased access to information for people in China and a more open Internet outweighed our discomfort in agreeing to censor some results. At the time we made clear that “we will carefully monitor conditions in China, including new laws and other restrictions on our services. If we determine that we are unable to achieve the objectives outlined we will not hesitate to reconsider our approach to China.”
These attacks and the surveillance they have uncovered–combined with the attempts over the past year to further limit free speech on the web–have led us to conclude that we should review the feasibility of our business operations in China. We have decided we are no longer willing to continue censoring our results on Google.cn, and so over the next few weeks we will be discussing with the Chinese government the basis on which we could operate an unfiltered search engine within the law, if at all. We recognize that this may well mean having to shut down Google.cn, and potentially our offices in China.
The decision to review our business operations in China has been incredibly hard, and we know that it will have potentially far-reaching consequences. We want to make clear that this move was driven by our executives in the United States, without the knowledge or involvement of our employees in China who have worked incredibly hard to make Google.cn the success it is today. We are committed to working responsibly to resolve the very difficult issues raised.
iJay
